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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Outside of the trademark registration process, the federal Lanham Act provides two 
causes of action, infringement and dilution, to holders of protectable trademarks to 
exclude others from using their marks.1  Both of these actions can be defeated by the 
defense of parody, which is a subset of the defense of “fair use.”  For actions against 
dilution of protectable marks, Congress formally codified the parody defense for the first 
time in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA,” 2006) amendments to the 
Lanham Act.2 
¶2 This Comment argues that codification has done little to strengthen protection of 
trademark parody in the courts.  Parody should be a strong bar to recovery, particularly in 
dilution actions in which the plaintiff is not required to prove confusion.  I argue that the 
existing body of law in this area suggests courts tend to be moralistic and unpredictable 
in their interpretation of the parody defense.  Finally, I suggest that the protection of 
parodies should be decided based on the question of whether a parody meets a stringent 
definition, not on whether the parody is more or less “commercial.”  Focusing on the 
commercial dimension has negative consequences for freedom of consumption.  
Focusing instead on the definition of the parody protects consumer freedom, while 
effectively preventing free riding.   
¶3 This Comment has a broad reach and seeks primarily to make a policy argument.  I 
proceed by critically analyzing case law and the reasoning behind groups of decisions.  I 
do not argue that any individual case should have been decided differently, but rather that 
courts’ approach to the parody defense should be reconsidered, as if necessary should the 
law.  In Section II, I address the basic policy rationales behind infringement and dilution.  
In Section III, I address the portions of the Lanham Act defining infringement and 
dilution.  In Section IV, I address the parody defense as it has been applied in the context 
of the Lanham Act and in similar state statutes.3  In Section V, I discuss the public policy 
arguments for refocusing judicial inquiry regarding the parody defense more towards the 
definition of a parody and away from the degree of commercialization, particularly when 
a defendant raises the parody defense against a dilution action. 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011. 
1 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2009).  (Subsequent statutory citations are all to this Act, and 
are divided by the Act’s internal section numbers.) 
2 § 43(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
3 Although this Comment focuses on the Lanham Act, I also discuss case law applying dilution and 
infringement actions at state law, where the cases serve to illustrate trends in the law and judicial behavior.  
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II. PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALES, INFRINGEMENT, AND DILUTION 
¶4 A central distinction between dilution and infringement actions, both in federal 
trademark law and also in state equivalents, concerns the public policy underlying the 
actions. Dilution and infringement have been designed to protect two different groups.  
Primarily, the infringement action serves to protect consumers.4  Infringement is an 
action brought by a holder of a trademark; success in court provides immediate and 
obvious advantages for a producer of goods.  However, consumers as a group are the 
stakeholders of greatest public policy concern.   
¶5 For example, when I buy a “Big Mac” I (a consumer) expect to receive a product 
made by McDonald’s (a producer), with all of the associated ingredients and standards of 
quality in production.  The public utility of the infringement cause of action inheres 
principally in the fact that I will not be bewildered into purchasing some interloping fast 
food item also called a “Big Mac,” or “Big Ma C”.  Likewise, public utility derives from, 
for example, the protection of trade dress from infringement.  Consumers are protected in 
the trade dress context from the confusion of entering a restaurant that looks exactly like 
a McDonald’s, but which is in fact a vegan diner.  In short, producers are permitted by 
law to seek a remedy for infringement at least in part because of the goodwill, or even 
mere consumer recognition, attached to their product.   
¶6 By contrast, the dilution action works principally for producers’ advantage.5  The 
dilution action does not directly pay dividends to consumers.  Rather, the dilution action 
protects trademarks from other producers.  It does so even where there is no appreciable 
risk that a consumer would mistake the origin of the product associated with the 
trademark.6  In fact dilution, which as with infringement is historically established in 
state law as well as federal, protects producers even where the defendant is not in direct 
competition with a plaintiff producer.  For example, through this action, one court found 
that the Georgia anti-dilution statute prohibited the production of sexualized images 
featuring Milky Way’s trademarks “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh.”7  This was not 
because of concern that consumers could be confused into thinking that the images were 
a product of Milky Way or because of Milky Way’s opportunity cost in not producing the 
images itself.  Rather, the court ruled that indirect association with the images “tarnished” 
Milky Way’s marks.   
¶7 Tarnishment is one of two subsets of dilution now codified under the TDRA, along 
with “blurring.”  The full scope of the dilution action is discussed below.  The salient 
point for the purposes of public policy, however, is that marks such as Milky Way’s are 
protected as if the exclusivity of the marks’ financial worth to one producer has inherent 
value—as if public policy demanded that no one else should benefit financially from the 
mark, even in a manner that the producer itself would never have considered.  From a 
public policy point of view, protection did not attach to Milky Way’s marks, as with 
infringement, because of the public utility of avoiding consumer confusion.  It attached 
out of private convenience to Milky Way.  Granted, Milky Way might not have filed suit 
 
4 Corina I. Cacovean, Is Free Riding Aided by Parody to Sneak Between the Cracks of the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 441, 444 (2009). 
5 Id. 
6 § 43(c)(1). 
7 Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 
1981). 
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under a dilution theory (or won), against a more quotidian use of its trademark—for 
example, “Milky Way Airlines.”  However, this is only to say that there may be a corpus 
of uses of “Milky Way” that is immune to dilution suits because it is less offensive and 
thus less tarnishing.  Whether under a tarnishment or a blurring theory of dilution, 
unconfused consumers are still deprived of the universe of uses that is not immune from 
dilution.  As far as cartoon pornography is concerned, that is perhaps not much of a loss 
to consumers.  However, as I will discuss, the reach of dilution is broader than the 
extreme example of Milky Way illustrates. 
III. THE LANHAM ACT 
A. Infringement 
¶8 The Lanham Act prohibits anyone, without prior consent from the trademark 
registrant, from using in commerce any “reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, distribution, or advertising of 
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause 
confusion . . . mistake, or to deceive.”8  It further prohibits reproduction, counterfeiting, 
copying, or imitating marks for reproduction in labels, signs, prints, packages, and so on, 
provided they are intended to be used in commerce in connection with sales, distribution, 
or advertising, and provided there is a likelihood of confusion.9   
¶9 In order to prove infringement against a third party under the Lanham Act a 
plaintiff needs to show that: (i) it owns a valid and protectable mark; (ii) the defendant 
has used a reproduction, counterfeit, copy or imitation of the mark in some kind of 
commerce without the plaintiff’s consent; and (iii) the defendant’s action is likely to 
cause confusion. 
¶10 In keeping with the value ascribed to protecting potentially confused consumers, 
the courts have afforded wide latitude to what could constitute confusion.  Confusion, 
broadly speaking, includes cases where consumers may not be confused as to the origin 
of the goods, but may be confused as to whether the non-mark-holding producer is in 
some way connected to the primary mark-holder.10   
¶11 The breadth of interpretation afforded to confusion has implications for the parody 
defense.  For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, the Eighth 
Circuit ruled that a magazine’s parody advertisement for Michelob beer, declaring 
“Michelob Oily,” could confuse consumers.11  Specifically, consumers could think that 
the satire was in some way “connected” or affiliated to the producer of the beer (even 
while not being confused into thinking that Michelob itself produced the parody).12  The 
court endorsed a broad interpretation of confusion: 
Many courts have applied, we believe correctly, an expansive interpretation of 
likelihood of confusion, extending “protection against use of [plaintiff's] mark on 
any product or service which would reasonably be thought by the buying public 
 
8 § 32(1)(a). 
9 § 32(1)(b). 
10 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 769. 
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to come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or 
sponsored by, the trademark owner.”13 
B. Dilution 
¶12 Notwithstanding the broad interpretation of confusion that courts have been willing 
to apply, as illustrated by Anheuser-Busch, the fact that confusion is required to sustain 
an infringement action at all is a distinction between infringement and dilution actions.  
This distinction is key in the context of the parody defense.  As confusion is not required 
in dilution actions, trademark holders can sustain actions against parody: (i) even where 
consumers get the joke, and (ii) where consumers are neither confused as to the origin of 
the parody, nor confused into thinking that the parody producer is affiliated with the mark 
holder.  As such, dilution implicitly prioritizes the value of the mark over the value of the 
joke, social commentary, satire, and so on that is contained in the parody.  Moreover, it 
prioritizes the “good name” of the mark over the comprehension of consumers that what 
they are viewing is not in fact a product of the mark holder, but is instead a joke. 
¶13 Although dilution is a recently codified addition to the Lanham Act, it is not a 
particularly recent doctrine.  Dilution has roots in European law, dating back to at least 
the nineteenth century.14  In 1927, Frank Schechter made the notion prominent on this 
side of the Atlantic when he wrote the seminal The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection for Harvard Law Review.15  Schechter’s central thesis was that trademarks, by 
1927, no longer represented merely the source of origin for goods, with their value being 
drawn from the consumer’s identification of the producer.  Rather, he argued that 
trademarks had become independent drivers of custom, detached from consumer 
recognition of the producer.16  Schechter argued that consumers had come to identify 
goods by the trademarks themselves, without regard for or knowledge of, the producer.  
His idea foreshadows modern mass production and byzantine corporate structures, which 
are clearly beyond the understanding of most consumers.17  Thus, Schechter’s article 
introduced the idea that trademarks have inherent value—that they are beacons for 
consumers in a foggy consumerist world.   
¶14 Further, Schechter concluded that “[t]rademark pirates are growing more subtle and 
refined.  They proceed circumspectly, by suggestion and approximation, rather than by 
direct and exact duplication of their victims’ wares and marks.”18  So the “pirates” 
threatened the inherent value of marks; the time had come to take some buccaneers to the 
gallows (or at least to federal court). 
¶15 Reviewing possible solutions to the guile of the modern trademark pirate, 
Schechter advocated something akin to the dilution doctrine, although without using the 
exact term.  Schechter discussed contemporary European cases involving well-known 
brands, such as Rolls-Royce, Kodak, and Vogue, where non-competing producers 
 
13 Id. at 774. 
14 See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 336 
(2002).  
15 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).  
16 Id. at 814–19.  
17 Id. at 814–16. 
18 Id. at 825.  
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appropriated their trademarks (for example producing Kodak bathtubs).19  Outlining a 
rationale for finding in favor of the primary user in these cases, Schechter defined what 
we now call dilution as “the whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon 
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.”20  Schechter 
supported providing greater protection for such brands, provided that the trademarks were 
arbitrary or fanciful.  He argued: 
[T]here is not a single one of these fanciful marks which will not, if used on 
different classes of goods, or to advertise different services, gradually but surely 
lose its effectiveness and unique distinctiveness . . . .  If “Kodak” may be used for 
bath tubs and cakes, “Mazda” for cameras and shoes, or “Ritz-Carlton” for 
coffee, these marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace words of the 
language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast 
expenditures in advertising them.21 
Schechter’s whittling away definition remains relevant today.  The Lanham Act provides 
that, subject to the principles of equity: 
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired 
distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at 
any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark 
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution 
by tarnishment . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely 
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.22 
This is a codified response to Schechter’s whittling away problem.  No confusion is 
required, likewise no “actual economic injury.”  Just as Kodak could not have proved that 
it lost out on bathtub profits—or probably even that it lost goodwill when people slipped 
and fell while bathing in a “Kodak” tub—so modern producers need not prove 
measurable injury to their bottom lines.  Holders are entitled to protect the “unique 
distinctiveness” of their marks without a greater showing of injury or, as in an 
infringement action, consumer confusion. 
1. Blurring 
¶16 Although the examples discussed so far pertain to the idea of dilution by 
tarnishment, blurring is also a version of dilution under the Lanham Act.  The language 
of the Act explains that blurring “impairs the distinctiveness” of the mark (whereas 
tarnishment “harms the reputation” of the mark).23  Blurring thus remains close to 
Schechter’s idea of whittling away identity.   
¶17 The underlying reasoning for disallowing blurring is that: (i) the mark is valuable 
because it has a particular association in the public mind (i.e. “distinctiveness” in the 
 
19 Id. at 825, 831. 
20 Id. at 825 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 830. 
22 § 43(c)(1). 
23 § 43(c)(2)(B)–(C). 
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language of the Lanham Act or “unique distinctiveness” in Schechter’s terms), and (ii) 
that anything reducing the popular association in turn damages the mark. 
2. Tarnishment 
¶18 Although now actionable under the Lanham Act, tarnishment was not always 
available as a federal cause of action and is a relatively recent development in trademark 
law.  In the landmark case, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme 
Court suggested, in dicta, that dilution by tarnishment would not be enforceable under the 
then-Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA,” 1999), unless actual economic harm 
could be shown.24  The case concerned a store selling adult products, which was initially 
called “Victor’s Secret,” and then, after threat of legal action, “Victor’s Little Secret.”  
(The change proved insufficient to forestall legal action by Victoria’s Secret.)  Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, cited Schechter’s article extensively and tried to be 
faithful to Schechter’s understanding of dilution.25     
¶19 However, the Supreme Court handed down Moseley in 2003.  In 2006, the TDRA 
marked a significant and deliberate shift away from Moseley.26  Incorporated into the 
Lanham Act, the TDRA expressly provides that both blurring and tarnishment are 
actionable at federal law.27  The TDRA also removed the requirement of actual economic 
injury under either theory.   
¶20 Unlike blurring, tarnishment clearly goes beyond Schechter’s definition.  Rather 
than relying on a preexisting association between the mark and popular consciousness, 
which could be subject to blurring, tarnishment expands the ambit of dilution to include 
the creation of alternative, new associations.  Specifically, it addresses new associations 
that are negative and could harm the reputation of the mark if left unchecked.  Milky Way, 
discussed above, serves as a paradigm example of tarnishment—a family-friendly 
product acquired new, unwanted associations with sex.28 
C. Standards Applied in Dilution Actions 
¶21 Courts assessing tarnishment and blurring are directed by the Lanham Act to apply 
different standards.  However, both actions require that the mark at issue is “famous.”29  
A mark is famous for the purposes of the Lanham Act if “it is widely recognized by the 
general consuming public as a designation of source of the goods or services of the 
mark’s owner.”30  The Act provides four factors to assess famousness: (i) the duration, 
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised 
 
24 Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).  
25 Id. at 429. 
26 § 43(c). 
27 § 43(c)(1). 
28 An alternative way of expressing this would be that Milky Way’s preexisting reputation for 
“wholesome fun” (or whatever the opposite of sex is) was damaged by association with sexualized images.  
This would make the rationale for tarnishment the same as for blurring—i.e., the damaging of a preexisting 
association.  However, it is clear that at least some courts have been willing to find for the plaintiff in 
tarnishment cases on the basis of a wholly new association, without consideration of existing associations.  
The action leaves open this option. 
29 § 43(c)(1). 
30 § 43(c)(2)(A). 
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or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) the amount, volume, and geographic 
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) the extent of actual 
recognition of the mark; and (iv) whether the mark was registered.31  Both actions also 
require, in another development under the TDRA, a finding of only likely rather than 
actual dilution (the latter had been the standard under the FTDA).32  Thus, dilution 
demands neither a showing of actual economic injury nor actual dilution. 
¶22 The Lanham Act provides six factors that courts may consider in blurring suits, 
subject to relevance: (i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the 
famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; 
(iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially 
exclusive use of the mark; (iv) the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (v) whether 
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous 
mark; and (vi) any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous 
mark.33   
¶23 The full definition of dilution by tarnishment is “association arising from the 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of 
the famous mark.”34  Lynda Oswald has noted that this definition is typically met in one 
of three possible scenarios, which also serve to illustrate some of the wide range of 
factors applied by courts in tarnishment cases.  The first scenario arises when “a 
plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of a shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an 
unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s 
product.”35  The second arises when the reproduction and the original are almost 
identical.  The third arises when “alterations of a mark are made by a competitor with 
both an incentive to diminish the favorable attributes of the mark and ample opportunity 
to promote its products in ways that make no significant alteration.”36 
¶24 Additionally, some commentators have posited the possibility that “free riding” 
should be regarded as a de facto third version of the dilution action, in addition to 
blurring and tarnishment.37  Without considering whether free riding is a freestanding 
theory of dilution (or whether it should be), as I discuss below, it is a significant public 
policy concern underlying dilution.   
IV. THE PARODY DEFENSE, WHOLESOMENESS, TORTIOUSNESS, AND INTENT 
¶25 To understand what parody means in the context of trademark law, it is informative 
to begin with a general definition of the term “parody.”  A widely cited and serviceable 
definition is that, in order to be successful, a parody must: (i) “convey two 
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not 
 
31 § 43(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
32 § 43(c)(2)(B). 
33 § 43(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
34 § 43(c)(2)(C). 
35 Lynda J. Oswald, “Tarnishment” and “Blurring” Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 277 (1999). 
36 Id. 
37 See Cacovean, supra note 4, at 453–54. 
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the original and is instead a parody;” and (ii) “communicate some articulable element of 
satire, ridicule, joking, or amusement.”38   
¶26 One commentator has noted that, for the first requirement of this definition, “the 
line between mimicry and deviation” is tough to traverse.39  If a parody doesn’t go far 
enough in distinguishing itself from the original product, then it risks being a source of 
confusion rather than parody, and would thus be vulnerable under an infringement action.  
On the other hand, if the parody goes too far then it risks becoming just a joke, without 
parodic content. 
¶27 Within the context of dilution, the parody defense is codified in the Lanham Act 
under the fair use exception, which states that “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or 
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark 
owner” is excluded from coverage by dilution.40  Initially this reads like an all-
encompassing protection for parodies.  However, the defense is not available for parodies 
that are primarily commercial, which is defined as “a designation of source for the 
person’s own goods.”41   
¶28 In practice, a further consideration as to whether a parody defense will be upheld is 
the distinction between a “wholesome” and “unwholesome” parody.  One illustration of 
this distinction is Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.42  Addressing an action 
under New Mexico’s trademark act, the case overtly employs the notion of 
wholesomeness.  The court found that Jordache Jeans, using a horse’s head logo, were 
not diluted by defendant’s “Lardashe” jeans for large size women (the defendant’s jeans 
featured a pig logo).  Addressing the plaintiff’s tarnishment argument, the court reasoned 
that an “undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association” had not been 
sufficiently created by the parody because it was not “particularly unwholesome,” 
although potentially “in poor taste” to some consumers.43 
¶29 Similarly, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. 
Windows Corp., the court addressed a motion for a preliminary injunction based on the 
theory that the defendant’s slogan “The Best Bar on Earth” tarnished, by association with 
alcohol, “The Best Show on Earth”—Ringling’s circus slogan.44  The court denied the 
injunction on the grounds of the plaintiff’s failure to prove likelihood of success on the 
merits.45  The court noted that the circus already played in some venues serving alcohol, 
and thus that an association with alcohol was neither new nor tarnishing.46   
¶30 By contrast, in Milky Way the court found injunctive relief appropriate where the 
defendant depicted plaintiff’s “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” characters in 
sexualized images.47  Similarly, in American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved 
 
38 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 
2001); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007). 
39 See Laura E. Little, Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 1265 (2009). 
40 § 43(c)(3)(A)–(A)(ii).  
41 § 43(c)(3)(A). 
42 Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D. N.M. 1985). 
43 Id. at 57. 
44 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
45 Id. at 211. 
46 Id. 
47 See supra Part II. 
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Laboratories, the court found for the plaintiff under New York anti-dilution law, in a 
motion for preliminary injunction against the defendant’s condom carrying-case.  The 
carrying-case was emblazoned with a bust of a gladiator and the words “America 
Express” and “Don’t Leave Home Without It.”48   
¶31 All of these tarnishment cases support the observation that courts are influenced by 
the perceived wholesomeness of the parody at issue, although—as discussed further 
below, and already illustrated by Ringling Bros.—the plaintiff’s prior reputation for 
wholesomeness is sometimes relevant too.  The relevance of the distinction between 
wholesome and unwholesome parodies is particularly evident for actions in which 
tarnishment is alleged.  As we have seen, tarnishment exists to prevent lessening the 
“commercial magnetism” or “magic” of the mark by the creation of new associations.49  
As common sense suggests, an action brought under this theory will be more credible 
where the new and supposedly negative association is not with puppies and sunshine, but 
rather with something “distasteful or off-putting” (unless perhaps the distinctive quality 
of the original product is that it is distasteful or off-putting).50   
¶32 Courts applying tarnishment theories are thus more likely to attach liability where 
the parody alludes to something risqué, offensive, or crude.  However, the outcome may 
also be influenced by the mode of humor employed.  Laura Little observes that, although 
not expressly recognizing this reasoning, courts are sometimes more likely to permit an 
ostensibly unwholesome parody where it involves “release humor”51 because release 
humor serves a social function.  Release humor involves making light of something in 
such a way as to induce catharsis.  “Incongruity humor,” by contrast, is more akin to 
being just a joke—and is less likely to find sympathy in court.  As implied by the name, 
incongruity humor simply means placing something where it would not normally be 
found (for example, in the non-parody realm, a frog drinking Budweiser). 
¶33 The wholesomeness of the parody seems as if it ought not to be relevant in the 
context of infringement actions.  The inquiry in this context, after all, is whether 
consumers are likely to be confused.  There is no obvious reason why confusion would 
turn on whether or not the parody is obscene.  Nevertheless, some infringement cases also 
evidence the willingness of courts to favor plaintiffs whose marks are linked by the 
defendant to prurient material.  In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., for example (cited in Jordache Enterprises as an example of a case 
illustrating a “particularly unwholesome” parody), the court held that a pornographic film 
featuring actresses in Dallas Cowboys cheerleader outfits was “sexually depraved,” and 
factored this consideration into its finding that the Cowboys’s marks had been 
infringed.52  Similarly, Coke was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against 
a supposed parody, “Enjoy Cocaine.”53  The court in this case held that this attempted 
parody failed, because it did not go far enough in distinguishing itself from the original to 
 
48 Am. Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Co., No. 87 Civ. 8840 (CSH), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4377 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989).  
49 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, 
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, § 30.6, at 719 (2003). 
50 Id.  
51 See Little, supra note 39, at 1267–68. 
52 Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D. N.M. 1985); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979). 
53 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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avoid a high likelihood of confusion.54  For no apparent reason, given the nature of the 
action, the court also noted in support of its holding: 
Judicial notice may be taken that cocaine is a narcotic drug possession of which 
for nonmedical purposes is a felonious criminal offense against the laws of the 
United States punishable by substantial prison terms and fines. . . .  The 
stringency of those laws reflects the national concern that cocaine—far from 
being “enjoyable”—is part of the tragic drug problem currently afflicting this 
nation, and particularly its youth.  To associate such a noxious substance as 
cocaine with plaintiff's wholesome beverage as symbolized by its “Coca-Cola” 
trademark and format would clearly have a tendency to impugn that product and 
injure plaintiff's business reputation.55 
On the other hand, there are more recent infringement cases that evidence a reversal of 
the trend in Pussycat Cinema and Coca-Cola.  In Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Co. the court made the obvious point that “the more distasteful and bizarre the parody, 
the less likely the public is to mistakenly think that the trademark owner has sponsored or 
approved it.”56  The court thus drew on the basic notion of confusion in infringement 
suits, avoiding the somewhat moralistic detour of the Pussycat Cinema and Coca-Cola 
decisions. 
¶34 Some have argued that an emphasis on perceived wholesomeness causes 
tarnishment to operate like an intentional tort.57  Just as defamation of a person requires 
injury to reputation, so tarnishment requires injury to the reputation of a mark.  One way 
of viewing these cases is that the defendant cannot tarnish a reputation that is already 
tarnished in the same manner.  A further way of looking at these cases, not previously 
considered, would be to say that the wholesomeness of the parody operates in a way 
analogous to the defense of “truth” in defamation.  It is true to say that “The Best Bar on 
Earth” is no less wholesome than an alcohol-serving circus—a true statement is thus 
implied in the parody of the circus.  Therefore, no new injurious association could be 
created.  By contrast, it is not true to say that American Express is already tarnished with 
sexual innuendo; therefore, the parody fails for want of an element of truth, and an 
injurious association could be created.  This accords with common sense.  A sketch 
depicting, for example, Mother Teresa as uncharitable and mean would not be a 
“parody”—there is no grain of truth to the depiction.  It would merely be a slur or, in the 
legal vernacular, a tarnishment.  Parody requires a kernel of truth, or at least believability, 
to avoid dilution.    
¶35 A final consideration regarding whether courts are likely to find that a parody 
defense is successful is the issue of intent.  Joseph Dreitler argues that courts consider 
intent when deciding whether a parody is valid, both for infringement and dilution 
actions.58  Specifically, Dreitler argues that courts ask whether the defendant intended to 
parody or to profit.  However, Dreitler’s account is inaccurate.  All infringement claims 
 
54 Id. at 1190. 
55 Id. at 1189. 
56 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
57 See Oswald, supra note 35, at 274. 
58 Joseph R. Dreitler, Comment: The Tiger Woods Case—Has the Sixth Circuit Abandoned Trademark 
Law? ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 38 AKRON L. REV. 337, 341 (2005). 
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require use in commerce, and all infringement claims require some kind of reproduction 
of a protected mark.  Assuming that these things do not happen by accident, intent to 
profit would always be satisfied.  The issue, as framed in the Lanham Act, is not whether 
the defendant intended to profit, but whether the defendant intended primarily to profit.  
Citing Wendy’s International, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., Dreitler claims the court found that 
the defendant’s use of Wendy’s trademarks in “Little Wendy” in its own advertising 
campaigns could not constitute a valid parody because the use of the marks was plainly 
an intentional ploy to free ride off the mark.59  However, Dreitler overstates the 
conclusiveness of the holding.  The court held that “where it is shown that the alleged 
infringer used the movant's mark knowingly and with the intention of deriving some 
benefit from it, a strong inference of probable confusion arises . . . .”60  A strong 
inference is not a categorical intent rule.  Nevertheless, the strong inference may still 
form part of a range of tools used by a court in assessing a parody-defense case.  It is 
simply that framing the issue solely as one of “intent to profit” is misleading.  As the next 
section discusses, the “commercial” dimension of speech is relevant to the parody 
defense, but it is not always dispositive—nor should it be. 
V. PARODY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
¶36 In this section, I argue that parody ought to be a stronger bar to relief.  Particularly, 
I argue that that parody should be a strong bar to recovery in dilution actions, even those 
where the alleged parody is commercially motivated. 
A.  Parody, the First Amendment, and Commercial Use 
A defendant generally asserts a parody defense to establish that consumers would 
not likely confuse the protected product with the challenged product or 
communication.  This argument may have force beyond simply negating an 
element of the plaintiff's claim, however, because of the solicitude accorded to 
parody under First Amendment case law.61 
There is a sliding scale of protection for parodies, predicated not merely on an assessment 
of wholesomeness, tortiousness, or intent, but also on the perceived political or apolitical 
content of the parody.62  The scale derives from First Amendment jurisprudence.  Courts 
afford political and cultural parodies a higher level of protection than commercial 
parodies.  For example, in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. a district court in Georgia held 
that Smith’s products (T-shirts and other novelty products) accusing Wal-Mart of, inter 
alia, “Walocaust,” and of being “Wal-Qaeda,” were analogous to sandwich-boards 
historically worn by protestors, and were noncommercial, political speech subject to First 
Amendment protection (even though Mr. Smith sold his creations).63  The court 
addressed the protection the First Amendment affords to parody and concluded that 
 
59 Id. at 342 (citing Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc. 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
60 Wendy’s, 576 F. Supp. at 822 (emphasis added).  
61 Little, supra note 39, at 1263–64. 
62 David H. Bernstein & Thomas H. Prochnow, Defense to Infringement—When the First Amendment 
Protects Trademark Parodies, 4 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (1998). 
63 Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
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“tarnishment caused merely by an editorial or artistic parody which satirizes [the 
complainant’s] product or its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute 
because of the free speech protections of the First Amendment.”64   
¶37 Similarly, in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that cultural 
content is afforded protection in parodies, although the defendant had been selling its 
parody.  Specifically, the court concluded that the “Barbie” doll is a cultural as well as a 
commercial symbol, and that Barbie could be a necessary component of artistic 
expression not merely a commercial symbol.65  The case addressed a song called “Barbie 
Girl,” by the band Aqua, which the manufacturer of Barbie (Mattel) claimed diluted its 
Barbie marks because of lyrics such as: “Life in plastic, it's fantastic.  You can brush my 
hair, undress me everywhere.”66  Mattel filed suit against the band’s record company, 
MCA Records.  Addressing the dilution claim, the court held for the defendant, noting: 
[T]he song also lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on the 
cultural values Aqua claims she represents.  Use of the Barbie mark in the song 
Barbie Girl therefore falls within the noncommercial use exemption to the 
FTDA.  For precisely the same reasons, use of the mark in the song's title is also 
exempted.67 
By contrast, a district court in Massachusetts held in General Electric Co. v. Alumpa 
Coal Co. that “Genital Electric” products, although seemingly similar to the equally 
doubtful “Walocaust” pun, were without protection because there was a “great 
probability of confusion among the general public.”68  In this case, unlike Mattel and 
Wal-Mart, the court did not consider a First Amendment issue relevant, because the 
message was intended for a primarily commercial purpose—i.e., to sell the joke, rather 
than to make the joke. 
¶38 The First Amendment should, however, always be relevant in parody-defense 
cases, and courts should not be quick to deny protection to parodies on the grounds that a 
parody is “primarily commercial”—if that requirement should remain in the Lanham Act 
at all.  The history of the First Amendment evidences a longstanding concern to protect 
parody, even where there is a commercial component to propagating the parody.  As the 
court in Wal-Mart in fact recognized, the correct question is not whether speech is 
commercial or not, but whether it is commercial to such an extent as to overwhelm the 
underlying parody.69  As I discuss below, it is virtually unimaginable, particularly in 
dilution actions, that commercial purpose ever overwhelms the parody, provided the 
parody is genuine.  Courts should begin by looking at whether the defendant has a 
genuine parody, not whether the parody is primarily commercial. 
 
64 Id. at 1339 (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
65 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2002).  
66 Id. at 901 (quoting AQUA, BARBIE GIRL (MCA Records 1997)). 
67 Id. at 907.    
68 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., No. 79-1815, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9197, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 
12, 1979). 
69 Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
 488
Vol. 9:7] Patrick Emerson 
B. Commercial Use and Free Riding 
¶39 Contrary to the prevailing trend in First Amendment jurisprudence, some 
commentators argue that the reluctance of courts to find First Amendment protection for 
parodies that are primarily commercial does not go far enough in preventing the use of 
the parody defense, and that parodies effectively provide a shield for free-riding.   
¶40 Corina Cacovean argues that, as a matter of policy, the law should diligently 
prevent free riding under the guise of parody.70  Cacovean notes that one possible 
approach to the commercial parody question is a subjective test looking at whether the 
defendant intended to exploit the existing mark commercially.  However, Cacovean 
concludes that, without an objective test, courts lack guidance.71  
¶41 According to Cacovean, an objective test would have changed the outcome in an 
often cited case, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog.  In this case, the Fourth 
Circuit ruled for the defendant, holding that “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys were valid 
parodies, despite the strong commercial impetus behind the parody.72   
¶42 Cacovean suggests a commercial gains test as an objective alternative to what she 
sees as the more subjective approach of the Fourth Circuit and other courts.  Cocovean’s 
test would reject the parody defense under either type of trademark action, either where 
the parody led directly to the sale of goods or where any commercial gain ensued to the 
defendant.  Cacovean argues such a test would be in keeping with the general public 
interest in preventing free riding.  Cacovean notes two possible models for such a test.   
¶43 First, Cacovean notes, “in South America, famous marks benefit from higher 
protection than that allowed to Louis Vuitton in United States.”73  She goes on to note 
that the Brazilian Patents and Trademarks Office recognizes a set of “highly renowned” 
trademarks which are, because of their “economic attractiveness,” afforded a higher level 
of protection.74  This group includes marks such as McDonald’s, Visa, and Hollywood.  
Cacovean goes on to note, “[i]n a large majority of cases the Special Commission 
[afforded] . . . special protection in all classes of goods and service.”75   
¶44 Second, under European law, “protection for famous marks in the European Union 
is more flexible.”76  Cacovean cites two cases from the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”), Davidoff & Cie S.A. v. Gofkid Ltd. and Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld 
Trading Ltd., where the court held that “the anti-dilution law is an overarching legal 
remedy applicable to any and all situations, whether the goods and services are 
competitive, similar, or non-similar.”77  Cacovean concludes that “[t]he ECJ 
interpretation reflects a tendency for a [sic] more flexible protection.”78 
 
70 Cacovean, supra note 4, at 443. 
71 Id. at 457. 
72 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
73 Cacovean, supra note 4, at 456. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 456 (quoting Ana Lucia de Sousa Borda, Highly Renowned Marks—Criteria Adopted by the 
BPTO for Their Recognition, 11 DANNEMANN SIEMSEN NEWS, Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.dannemann.com.br/files/dsnews_200512_en.pdf). 
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¶45 However, as we have seen, Cacovean’s strict “any commercial gains” test would 
not comport with the First Amendment.  Cases such as Wal-Mart and Mattel show that 
the First Amendment affords at least some protection to parodies, even where the 
parodies lead to commercial gain.   
¶46 On other hand, parodies are not protected where they are primarily commercial.  
This leaves parodies in a gray area when they are associated with products for sale, but 
are arguably not primarily a commercial endeavor.  Balancing a Cacovean-like position 
with the other pole—i.e. absolute permissiveness—we need to ask, not just what is best 
for trademark holders, but also what is best for consumers? 
C. Parody and Consumer Freedom 
¶47 A rigid prohibition on profiting from parodies of trademarks would not be a policy 
favorable to the majority of consumers.  The general disadvantage for consumers can be 
illustrated by a “literary” reference. 
¶48 In the comedy movie, Coming to America, Eddie Murphy plays an African Prince 
named Akeem, who “comes to America” seeking a wife who will accept him for his 
personality, rather than his nobility.  He takes a position at “McDowell’s,” a restaurant 
with all of the hallmarks of a McDonald’s, including big golden arches, and a specialty 
burger, the “Big Mick.”79   
¶49 In the real world, the name of Prince Akeem’s employer would probably amount to 
infringement of McDonald’s trademarks.  Indeed, the restaurant in the movie is “under 
investigation” by McDonald’s.  Nevertheless, despite the many aspects of Coming to 
America that require suspension of disbelief, the fact that McDowell’s consumers do not 
appear to be “confused” by the McDonald’s-esque diner is not one of them.  It is wholly 
credible that consumers would recognize the distinction between McDonald’s and this 
comically bad imitation.   
¶50 This speaks to a broader point about the acute perceptions and distinguishing 
capabilities of actual consumers, who are often divorced from: (i) the rarified discussion 
of doctrine, and (ii) the focus on the parties to lawsuits (typically two commercial 
producers).  One commentator argues that a problem with infringement actions is that, 
the confusion requirement notwithstanding, they actually fail to protect the vast majority 
of consumers who have the common sense not to be confused.80  Michael Grynberg 
notes, in one case: 
The specificity of the harm of confusion to a survey-defined group of buyers 
easily trumped the harms to the nonconfused who were never considered as a 
distinct class.  The defendants stood alone; the court considered only their 
interest in the plaintiff's marks, not the interests of the public for whom the 
defendants were a proxy.81 
The public policy of protecting consumers from confusion is not well served by finding 
producers liable for parodies in situations where the parodies at issue simply would not 
 
79 COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988). 
80 Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008). 
81 Id. at 99.  
 490
Vol. 9:7] Patrick Emerson 
confuse the silent majority of consumers (even if the parody confused some consumers in 
a sample group used as trial evidence).  Similarly, Little makes the point that “consumers 
understand that it would be incongruous for the profit-maximizing producer of a 
protected product to undercut the product.”82  
Grynberg’s position is persuasive.  However, it is open to attack on the grounds that it 
relies on prioritizing one public benefit (free consumption) over another (not confusing 
less sophisticated consumers) without much justification.83  Furthermore, while Grynberg 
might be right that existing law errs in privileging the prevention of confusion over free 
consumption, his seems like an argument for making confusion harder to prove.  
Grynberg thus misses the bigger point.  The strongest case to be made for protecting 
consumers against the over-sensitive and litigious natures of producers is not in 
infringement actions, but in dilution actions.  Dilution actions are in no way underpinned 
by an interest in directly protecting consumers.  Dilution does not overlook unconfused 
consumers, instead it avoids consideration of consumer interests altogether.  Dilution 
exists to prevent rival producers from making famous brands look bad or less distinctive, 
while at the same time profiting from the denigration of the famous brand.  As such, 
dilution actions fit perfectly into the problematic mold of Producer X v. Producer Y 
litigation, because consumer benefits are at best an unintended consequence of the 
litigation.  
¶51 There are at least two reasons why protecting famous trademarks from dilution, 
even dilution via a parody that is itself commercialized, is a dubious position.  The first 
reason for thinking that famous trademarks do not require protection from dilution recalls 
the rationale in Twentieth Century Fox—namely, that “unwholesome” parodies can in 
fact be the least problematic of parodies.  The court in that case stated, “the more 
distasteful and bizarre the parody, the less likely the public is to mistakenly think that the 
trademark owner has sponsored or approved it.”84  Turning that logic on its head, we can 
say that the less distasteful and bizarre the trademark, the more likely it is that a parody 
will seem innocuous.  In other words, famous brands (by definition not distasteful to 
many consumers) do not need protection to sustain their “magic.”  Famous trademarks 
are those least in danger of being diluted, because they already command mass public 
recognition and approval.  This follows, provided that consumers are not actually 
confused into thinking that what they are looking at—i.e. a parody—is genuinely a 
product of the original producer.  This eventuality, however, would be actionable under 
infringement.   
¶52 Again, a common sense check is sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of 
this position. For example, consider Vibra Approved Laboratories.  Why would someone 
actually be less likely to open an American Express account because they had witnessed 
a condom case with a similar logo, when they knew the case had nothing to do with the 
real American Express? 
¶53 The second reason for thinking that famous brands do not require protection from 
negative associations is purely functional.  Conventional free-market economics theory 
 
82 Little, supra note 39, at 1263. 
83 In addition, Grynberg it fails to account for the role of trademark protection in incentivizing 
innovation, albeit that this argument is weaker in a trademark context—where no creative content or ideas 
are involved—than in other areas of intellectual property. 
84 Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
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dictates that famous marks are famous because of the quality of the underlying product.  
To be sure, marketing also plays a role in selling goods.  However, it is to be expected 
that consumers will eventually shun shoddy products no matter how well they are 
marketed, in favor of a superior product.  It follows that if famous brands represent 
genuinely superior products they will continue to succeed because of their quality, 
irrespective of dilution of their marks.  If American Express genuinely has the best deals 
on credit cards, then being associated with condom carrying cases should not matter.  On 
the other hand, if the benefits of being an American Express member were merely 
smoke-and-mirrors, easily shattered by a cheap joke, then the product deserves to fail.   
¶54 As I have presented it, the second point is a little simplistic.  It is true that a good 
parody could affect the sales even of a superior product, for example by making 
ownership of it simply embarrassing.  However, the reality is that dilution already fails to 
protect against this risk.  There is no obvious reason for thinking that purely 
commercialized parodies are more likely to be successful at creating embarrassment than, 
say, a sketch on “Saturday Night Live” or a viral video online, both of which would 
likely be protected as artistic content.   
¶55 In practice, it is apparent that what dilution serves to protect is an elite group of 
famous brands—the very group whose trademarks are least in need of protection.  It 
should not be surprising that, as one one commentator notes, “Federal dilution has 
become a luxury claim.”85  As Schechter effectively showed, dilution laws are a product 
of the bygone and paternalistic protection of elite, luxury European brands.  Under the 
Lanham Act, ironically, trademarks are not really protected against dilution, which is still 
possible under non-commercial guises.  Instead, famous marks are protected against valid 
but commercial enterprises, which are doing little more than profiting from the public 
preference for mocking power.  This runs contrary to free competition, and contrary to 
the interests of a public capable of being discerning—capable of getting the joke.   
D. Parody First, Commercialization Second 
¶56 The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, I do not mean to suggest that the dilution 
action should be completely removed, as it has some clear virtues.  Indeed, even in the 
context of parody, there are obvious reasons why a multinational fast food company, for 
example Burger King, should be prevented from producing a product called, 
“McDonald’s Death Nuggets.”  Very little public function is served by insults made by 
obviously self-interested parties—even if those insults might look like parodies to some 
observers. 
¶57 However, the definition of a successful parody is already sufficiently narrow to 
avoid this risk.  Courts should not be concerned, primarily, with whether the creator of a 
parody also profits and to what extent.  The definition of a genuine parody should be the 
first consideration of any court addressing the parody defense.  This approach—parody 
first, commercialization second—retains the benefits of the dilution action, while better 
protecting consumer interests.   
 
85 Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a Luxury Claim and a 
Parody Exemption, 8 N. C. J. L. & TECH 205, 221 (2007).  Gerhardt misguidedly approves of the fact that 
the number of producers famous enough to use the dilution action is small, as she believes it will limit the 
overall number of uses of the action.  This perspective overlooks the relative power, over both competitors 
and producers of parodies, of those producers fortunate enough to be in this minority. 
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¶58 Recall that a parody must (i) “convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody;” 
and (ii) “communicate some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or 
amusement.”86  This means that mere insults and negative marketing, even if they meet 
the element of being satirical or amusing, fall short of the required standard.  Such a 
product as McDonald’s Death Nuggets obviously would not convey “convey two 
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not 
the original and is instead a parody.”  As we have seen, “the line between mimicry and 
deviation” 87 is tough to traverse, and the mimicry in this hypothetical would be palpably 
weak.  No-one could ever, even for a fleeting moment, think that McDonald’s actually 
produced this product (conceivably around Halloween, or the release of a movie called 
“Death,” etc.—but not otherwise).   
¶59 Courts, therefore, could begin with inquiry into whether a parody is genuine 
because that approach is workable—it proposes two understandable elements already 
used.  In addition, this approach is desirable, because it returns the focus of inquiry to the 
consumer.  By looking, first, at whether a parody is genuine, rather than at whether it is 
primarily commercial, a court would protect any successful parody as a matter of law.  
Whether a producer could be losing out on perceived “brand magnetism,” by the 
whittling away of its good name, would be very much a secondary inquiry.  This 
approach would accord with protecting freedom of consumption, and would avoid 
removing the interests of unconfused consumers from the judicial calculus.  To be sure, it 
might lead to unpredictable results.  Asking a court to determine what is funny and 
genuinely parodic is unlikely to be more predictable than asking it to determine what is 
commercial.  However, the court would be forced to consider the parody itself—the item 
in the equation given First Amendment solicitude—and to do so from a consumer’s point 
of view.  This, at least, begins the analysis in the right place. 
¶60 Again, any confusion created by a parody product would still be actionable under a 
theory of infringement.  The point of focusing on genuine parodies is not to allow chaos 
and confusion to rein on restaurant menus or supermarket shelves.  However, in order to 
retain the advantages of a dilution action, while also protecting freedom of consumption, 
courts should ask not whether a supposed parody is primarily commercial, but whether it 
is a parody at all.  A real-life “McDowell’s,” tucked away in a corner of the Bronx?  
Maybe.  Burger King’s hypotehtical “McDonald’s Death Nuggets?”  Clearly actionable.  
The answer, in other words, is merely to enforce the definition of “parody,” not to 
scrutinize the degree of commercialization behind the speech.   
¶61 The only time that commercialization would need to be assessed, under a 
definition-first approach, would be when the question of whether a parody was 
successful proved inconclusive.  This follows because assessing the degree of 
commercialization is, in fact, an indirect way of assessing the genuineness of a parody.  
A genuine parody is by definition not “primarily commercial,” because a primarily 
commercial message ceases to be a parody, and becomes instead a marketing device or 
an advertisement.  There are not two contradictory messages in an advertisement, there is 
only one: “buy me.” 
 
86 See supra Section V. 
87 See Little, supra note 39, at 1265. 
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¶62 A parody may not be primarily commercial.  However, commercial speech may be 
a parody.  By beginning the analysis with the question of whether the speech is 
commercial, courts begin the inquiry in the wrong place.  In doing so, they cut consumer 
interests in consuming genuine parodies out of the equation, or at least relegate those 
interests to a secondary concern.  Courts should begin by asking whether the defendant 
produced a genuine parody.  If it did, that should end the inquiry.  If the answer is 
inconclusive then, and only then, should the court should consider whether the parody is 
primarily commercial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶63 “The protection of trademarks originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the 
grievous deceit of the people’ by the sale of defective goods, and to safeguard the 
collective good will and monopoly of the gild.”88   
¶64 Today, preventing the “grievous deceit of the people” remains a valid public-policy 
concern.  However, I have argued that prohibiting parodies that cause no confusion, and 
that successfully meet the specific requirements of a genuine parody, serves no public 
benefit.  Instead, it risks creating a modern-day guild, comprising the handful of famous 
marks that fall under the ambit of the federal dilution action, with unprecedented power 
to enjoin and seek damages for parody.   
¶65 Parody should be interpreted as a strong bar against relief in dilution actions, 
defeated only in cases in which a supposed parody is not really a parody at all.  This 
approach gives proper weight to the interests of consumers and to the protection of 
parodies. 
88 Schechter, supra note 15, at 819. 
